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DISTRUSTING THE “ARCHIMEDEAN VIEW” OF PHILOSOPHY: A PLEA 
FOR TOLERANCE IN THE “VOICES AND CONVERSATIONS OF MANKIND” 
Abstract 
 It is not uncommon to hear philosophers or even students of philosophy when 
asked to define their discipline to say that philosophy is the ‘queen of the sciences’, ‘first 
philosophy’, and so on. These phrases and appellations are often deliberately ascribed to 
philosophy to denote its centrality to human existence and pursuits as well as its 
rootedness or connection to other disciplines. 
 They can attempt to justify this by jokingly saying that after all, the academic 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy’ (Ph.D), which is usually awarded after some years of 
research and course work is given in due respect and obeisance to its ancestry and 
gerontologically prior to all classes of knowledge viz, humanities, social sciences and 
natural science. At a deeper level, it offers useful insights into knowing the business and 
preoccupation of philosophers from the ancient through modern to contemporary periods. 
Here, the main concern of the philosopher is to conceive philosophy and its task as a 
cognitive enterprise and attempt, to establish through conceptual analysis any claims to 
knowledge. In this conception, philosophy examines the substructure of issues and raises 
foundational or second-order questions. 
 The intent of this paper is to show that philosophy still retains its original image, 
but its omnibus interpretation and application by some scholars in the present time throws 
up some problems, one of which is the dictatorial and hegemonic tone implicit in the 
conception which may inadvertently marginalize and sideline the emergence of other 
forms of discourses. The paper concludes by making a case for tolerance of other 
alternative forms of knowledge other than the Western. 
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Exposition 
Our discussion here cannot be complete if we fail to make a foray into how 
philosophy was traditionally conceived and how it now or at least ought to look with the 
insights of Rorty’s pragmatism, the post-empiricist philosophers of science and post-
modernist thinkers, among others. As it is now familiar, philosophy was generally 
believed to be a foundational discipline with the business of analyzing and clarifying 
concepts and ideas in other areas of discourse and culture. This conception is based on 
the assumption that philosophical questions are second-order or conceptual questions as 
contrasted with first-order or factual questions addressed by other discourses like 
mathematics, history, sociology e.t.c. Hence, philosophers, apart from looking at the 
substructure and raising foundational questions in both areas of discourses attempt to set 
limits to what can be known since they are equipped with the techniques of logical 
analysis. 
This conception of the business of philosophy was championed and propagated by 
the logical positivists with their twin-sister linguistic analysis, which were a by-product 
of analytic philosophy. Even though analytic philosophy was a dominant mode of 
philosophizing in the Anglo- America, its actual origin can be traced to Europe following 
the works of Frege, early Wittgenstein, Russell, Moore, as well as the activities of the 
logical positivists of the Vienna Circle fame in the 1920’s and 1930’s. And going further 
back in history, one can say that some of the presuppositions and methods of analytic 
philosophy can be culled from the works of modem philosophers, namely, Descartes, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant as well as the writings of Plato and Aristotle in the ancient 
period. 
Since ancient period philosophy has been concerned with the problems of 
epistemology. Here one recalls the doubts expressed by the sophists particularly 
Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini to the effect that an absolutely certain 
knowledge is impossible. The scpticism as expressed by the sophists obviously aroused 
the interest of philosophers to search for the ultimate foundation for all our knowledge 
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claims apparently to undermine the sceptic’s position and thereby restore confidence on 
the possibility of knowledge. 
Such problems that have traditionally agitated the minds of epistemologists are 
many and varied and can be categorized into three broad ways. The nature of knowledge 
or meaning of epistemic terms, the validation of cognition or the criteria of knowledge 
and the relation between cognitive experience and its objects1. Thus it is proper to say 
that epistemology, since its history that dates back to Plato and the modem period, 
focuses on the origin, nature, scope and justification of knowledge in all its ramifications. 
Perhaps, this is true of what Michael Williams intends when he says, “Epistemology is 
concerned with the nature or structure of the justification of our most important beliefs, 
our belief in the existence of the physical world”2.  
What emerges from the above is that epistemologists usually assure that there 
exists an objective world or physical reality and a person (subject) that knows it. Also 
there is the notion of truth, which they claim possesses the status of an objective 
existence independent of the cognizing subject (person). The assumption here is that the 
cognitive subject is said to be certain or sure of any belief he holds, if and only if such 
belief is justified and believes that it is justified. In other words, there has to be some sort 
of interaction between what a person is certain of and truth which objectively exists. 
When this happens, then a person can ascribe truth to what he is certain of. Hence, 
knowledge has been defined, according to John Kekes, following Plato, as justified true 
belief. Here a person can be said to know a proportion if and only if the proposition is 
true, he believes that the proposition is true and he is justified in believing that the 
proposition is true3. 
Let me state that it is not our business to go into the polemics surrounding the 
traditional conception of knowledge – especially those raised by Edmund Gettier4, who 
formulated some counter-examples to show that it is perfectly possible for a person to 
accept a true and justified proposition without necessarily knowing that that proposition 
is true contrary to the traditional analysis which suggests that a person is said to know 
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something if and only if it is true, believed and justified – but to say that the justification 
condition is the root of the search for some basic or non-inferential propositions. 
The justification condition simply suggests that merely having a true belief is not 
sufficient for knowledge. What is sufficient therefore is that such true belief be justified. 
In other words, there must be sufficient reasons or justification for believing a particular 
proposition. Put differently, a sufficient reason or justification presupposes that there 
must be something that supports or provides evidence for the truth of what one believes. 
This is true because sometimes people worry about whether they actually know what they 
claim to know. For instance, in a law court, it is certainly not enough to say that an 
accused person is guilty of a particular crime, it is important that the members of a jury 
be provided with sufficient reasons or justification to show that the accused person really 
committed the offence. In this case what the jury wants is evidence that establishes that 
the accused is actually guilty of the crime. Thus, the belief cannot be guaranteed without 
sufficient reasons or justification. 
But it is argued that however reliable sufficient reasons or justification are in 
yielding true belief, it is still a matter of dispute amongst philosophers how much is 
enough evidence or justification is needed? Besides, justification also leads to a 
regression. This problem occurs because of the assumption of the traditional 
epistemologist that for a belief to be justified it is not enough for it to be true, nor merely 
believed, there must be sufficient reasons or justification for believing it. On the basis of 
this assumption, some beliefs are justified by reference to other. The latter beliefs upon 
which the justification of the former beliefs are based are thought to be well confirmed. 
But a problem seems to emerge here, because if every belief were dependent on others 
for its justification, then no belief would ever be justified. This is so because in order to 
justify any belief at all, it would require a prior justification of an infinite series of beliefs 
and thereby leading to some sort of vicious circularity. 
It is, however, not proper for knowledge to go on in this circular manner, 
otherwise nothing is ever justified and consequently no knowledge is attained. Also if this 
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regress is not stemmed, it will no doubt reinforce the position of the sceptic who argues 
that we do not or cannot know anything. One of the implications of this is either all 
systems of beliefs are arbitrary or that there is no rational way of deciding between the 
merits of conflicting claims of religion and science, science and pseudoscience5. Even 
though scepticism has been charged with self- contradiction from its avowed position, 
that is, we can know that we cannot know anything, it nonetheless points to the obvious 
fact that knowledge is not, as it were, a finished business, and that something more ought 
to be done. The sceptic’s strictures also stimulated the philosopher’s interest in searching 
for a position that will not only ground knowledge, but also prove that epistemic claims 
are possible and justifiable too. 
This optimism to ground all epistemic claims on a class of basic non-inferential 
beliefs and thereby arrest the regress of justification inevitably leads to foundationalism. 
There is no better way to understand what foundationalism means other than to say that it 
aims to achieve, among other things, the apodictic certainty upon which all other beliefs 
rest and to determine whether our search for justification, based on other beliefs will not 
plunge us into an infinite regress. The strategy of the foundational epistemologist is to 
divide our beliefs into two categories, namely those which need support from others and 
those which are non-inferentially justified and provide justification for other beliefs in an 
ordered, hierarchical system of knowledge. It is not clear what foundationalists meant by 
non-inferential justification, except that some of them took it to be either infallibly 
justified when justification precludes the possibility of error. This point is well stated by 
Anthony Quinton when he says: 
If any beliefs are to be justified at all.., there must be some terminal beliefs that do 
not owe their credibility to others. For a belief to be, it is not enough for it to be 
accepted, let alone merely entertained, there must be good reasons for accepting 
it. Furthermore for an inferential belief to be justified the beliefs that support it 
must be justified themselves6. 
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Thus the epistemological ideal of foundationalism, according to Kekes, is to begin an 
inquiry with an unassailable foundation, conduct it in accordance with strict rules, and 
aim to end up with a system which accurately depicts the world7. 
The history of philosophy (epistemology) is full of attempts to provide basic 
incorrigible beliefs which provide justification for other beliefs but need no justification 
themselves. To this extent, the two dominant traditions in philosophy, namely 
Continental rationalism and British empiricism have tended to provide justification for 
our beliefs about the external world. Both agree that knowledge is possible and that there 
is a criterion or foundation that is basic and ultimate enough to serve as the reason for the 
justification of other epistemic claims. The idea here is that the rationalists and 
empiricists are foundationalists to the extent that they seek to find a certain, immutable 
and apodictic foundation which will serves as the basis of other beliefs. 
 The rationalists claim that knowledge must be absolutely certain and that it comes 
by a process of reasoning from self-evident first principles. According to them, deductive 
proof exhibited in mathematics and geometry is the surest way to develop an absolutely 
certain knowledge, because a valid argument guarantees that its conclusion is true if its 
premises are true. Rene Descartes, usually regarded as the father of modern philosophy, 
serves as the paradigm of the group. His aim, among others, is to show that we really do 
have knowledge and consequently put paid to the skeptical speculations to the effect that 
knowledge is unattainable. As he says: 
It is now some years since I detected how many false beliefs that I had from my 
earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since 
constructed on this basis, and from that time I was convinced that I must once for 
all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly 
accepted, and commence to build a new from the foundation, if I wanted to 
establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences8. 
On the contrary, the empiricist argues that justification resides in sense perception 
and the inner perception of the operations of the mind itself. It should be noted that the 
empiricists do not deny that we can reason about our ideas. Rather, they claim that the 
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relations among our ideas apply to the external world. This argument might seem 
circular, but it is not. This is because one can demonstrate to a child, for instance, that 2 + 
2 = 4 by bringing two dolls plus another two dolls which equals to four dolls. Although, 
this is a fact of mathematics which is known a priori it nonetheless can be proved 
empirically. The point here is that the empiricists share the belief that ultimate 
justification consists in our direct awareness of the object of knowledge. Thus, the basic 
thrust of their argument is that if one is directly aware of an object of knowledge, what 
one is aware of will neither be questioned, nor justified in terms of anything else. 
Following from what has been stated, we can see that both rationalist and 
empiricist philosophers were foundationalists to the extent that they seek to ground 
knowledge on an absolutely certain foundation, although through different approaches. 
The other feature which characterized the orientation of these philosophers, including 
Kant, as we shall see shortly, is the distinction they made between subject and object, that 
is, the distinction between the knowing mind or cognitive subject and the external world 
that it confronts and seeks to know. It is argued that Descartes’ theory provided the 
ground for this sort of dichotomy since he claimed that the only thing we can be certain 
or sure of, even by the most radical sceptic, is the existence of the mind itself or 
consciousness. Here one recalls his famous dictum, cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I 
am) which he took as the foundation of his philosophy. It needs restating that our attempt 
here is not a full-blown analysis of Descartes philosophy, but only to show that the 
Cartesian doctrine of the mind as the private inner stage or the inner mirror in which 
cognitive action takes place may have been influenced by Plato’s ideas of truth and 
knowledge, and thereby inaugurated the Archimedean view of philosophy that is, 
foundationalism and objectivism. 
 What emerges from these, is that the mind-body problem which has engulfed 
modern philosophy is based on Plato’s acceptance, as it were, of the ‘optical metaphor of 
an eye of the mind’ in an attempt to explain our knowledge of universals and eternal 
truths, which the Greeks, following the Platonic insights, thought of the mind as a sort of 
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mirror concerned mainly with the eternal things. No doubt, Descartes appropriated this 
Platonic idea because he (Descartes) saw the mind as a mirror held up to nature and truth 
as the achievement of accurate representations. This is the idea behind presenting 
philosophy as an ‘inner eye’ inspecting and passing judgments on the credentials of the 
various specific branches of knowledge. In other words, the Cartesian attempt was to 
metalize the Platonic doctrine of knowledge as inner representation of outer reality. But 
the distinction between the inner representation and outer reality or ‘states of 
consciousness’ and ‘physical events’ was unknown to the Greeks before Descartes’ 
invention. That is to say that the mind-body problem was alien to the ancient Greeks prior 
to Descartes’ philosophy because as Wallace Matson says why the Greeks had no mind 
body problem is that it is difficult, almost impossible, to translate such a sentence as what 
is the relation of sensation to mind (soul) into Greek and this is due to the problem in 
finding a Greek equivalent of sensation in the sense philosophers made it bear9. The point 
then is that with Descartes’ philosophy, the problem of consciousness became a central 
problem for philosophy. Also it is claimed that Descartes appealed to indubitability as a 
criterion of the mental thereby paving the way for the transformation of the mind-body 
problem into an epistemological issue. This point is well taken by Rorty when he says: 
Whereas previous philosophers had more or less followed Plato in thinking that 
only the eternal was known with certainty, Descartes was substituting clear and 
distinct perception that is the sort of unconfused knowledge gained by going 
through a process of analysis for indubitability as a mark of eternal truths. This 
left indubitability free to serve as a criterion of the mental10. 
What is stated here is that the Cartesian metaphor of mind as mirror which accurately 
gives us a representation of reality lies at the root of epistemological foundationalism 
since this representation is taken to be accurate once the knowledge we have of reality is 
privileged, that is, guaranteed as reliable and indubitable. 
The same problem is noticeable in the empiricist philosophy and Kant’s 
‘transcendenta1 philosophy since they started their theorizing on the same subject-object 
dualistic framework, and mentalistic model to the problem of epistemology. The 
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difference between their positions and those of the rationalist is that instead of following 
the pathway which Descartes and others have threaded, that is, reason, they appealed to 
the ‘data of sense-experience as the basis for determining any claim to knowledge’. 
It is worth stating that it is not our business to give a detailed elaboration of 
Kant’s critical philosophy, but only to show that his ambition to reconcile the extreme 
views of rationalists, whose position commits them to holding analytic (a priori) 
judgement, and empiricists, whose position leads to synthetic (a posteriori) judgement, 
forced him to introduce a third kind of judgement which he calls synthetic a priori which 
he claims overcomes the pitfalls of the two traditions since synthetic a priori judgement, 
though necessarily true can neither be based wholly upon a mere logical analysis of the 
concepts they contain nor upon observation and the way things happen to be in the world. 
According to Kant science and propositions of mathematics exhibited such judgement 
because certain propositions like 2 + 2 = 4 and ‘every event has a cause’, although are 
endowed with the necessity of analytic judgement still possess the novelty of synthetic a 
posteriori judgement.  
Following from this, Kant is still committed to the subject-object dualistic 
scheme; that is, the same mentalistic orientation of his predecessors in the modern period 
such that even his most unapologetic admirers as Sellars and Strawson, especially the 
latter have criticized what they regard as Kant’s fictitious mental machinery and his 
imaginary subject of transcendental psychology11. In other words, Strawson noticed some 
sort of quasi-psychological images and metaphor in Kant’s epistemological doctrine akin 
to the Cartesian inner representation and Lockean psycho-physiology which he attempted 
to overcome. This point is well stated by Rorty when he says: 
We are now inclined to say that Kant still shared too much with the Cartesian 
tradition he tried to overcome. Specifically, he sometimes seems to have done 
little more than substitute a description of a mysterious non mental cognitive 
faculty for a physiology of the human understanding or for a dogmatic 
metaphysics, thus once again reducing the guaestio juris to a guaestio facti12 
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What we can cull from Rorty’s deposition is that Kant’s view connects with those 
of Descartes’ and Locke’s. Such views, and those of other philosophers who share Kant’s 
transcendental argument must obviously argue that there is a thing as philosophical 
criticism of the rest of culture and that the philosopher can say something which science 
cannot about the claims of objectivity and rationality to which various parts of culture are 
entitled13. Now the structure of Kant’s transcendental argument which we reject in this 
essay can be stated thus: 
The legitimating of such knowledge without the aid of absolute principles is only 
possible as a demonstration of the lack of alternatives to that knowledge. It can 
only be demonstrated that in this and in no other manner is knowledge possible, 
and this can only be demonstrated in that alternative forms of knowledge are ruled 
out. This is the way of legitimation open to Kant14. 
From Kant’s view, philosophers see themselves as standing in a vantage position 
and identifying the goal of philosophy as critique of culture, and as legitimator of claims 
to truth, rationality, or objectivity on the part of other disciplines’. In an apparent attempt 
to build the Cartesian quest for certainty, for legitimation, for guarantees of rationality 
into philosophy’s self-image, Kant professionalized and thereby inaugurated the belief 
which is at the root of the epistemology-centred conception of philosophy- a conception 
which sees philosophy as a kind of cultural overseer’, as an all-encompassing discipline 
which legitimizes or ground the others. In other words, this view takes the proper 
business of philosophy as that of investigating the foundations of the sciences, the arts, 
culture and morality, and adjudicates the cognitive claims of these areas. 
Thus philosophy as epistemology claimed to be an objective tribunal, one to 
which all other descriptions of reality, and types of discourse were brought for 
assessment. This is the view of philosophy as the “Queen of the sciences’, since it is 
presumed that the sciences are ignorant of their own presupposition and the rationale of 
their method and that it is the proper business of philosophy to articulate these 
presupposition and adjudicate their validity15. Besides making philosophy- as-
epistemology to become self-conscious and self-confident, Kant also takes everything we 
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say to be about something we have constituted and as such makes it possible for 
epistemology to be thought of as a foundational discipline capable of discovering the 
conceptual characteristics of any area of human knowledge. As Rorty puts it, “He (Kant) 
thus enabled philosophy professors to see themselves as presiding over a tribunal of pure 
reason, able to determine whether other disciplines were staying within the legal limits 
set by the structure of their subject matters”16. 
What Rorty seems to be saying here is that Kant provided the framework for 
viewing philosophy as an objective tribunal, one to which all other discourses have to be 
brought for assessment. Also, it is argued that with Kantian transcendentalism, 
philosophy branches into different directions, prominent among them were the Anglo-
Saxon and Continental phenomenological traditions. Needless to say, that it is within this 
broad framework that such perennial philosophical questions such as mind-body dualism, 
word-world relationships, the analytic-synthetic fact-value and necessary-contingent 
distinctions, among others, were discussed17. 
Paradigm Shift 
Here, we shall examine some contemporary attempts to evolve an alternative 
discoursive conception to the above view. Beginning with Quine, who in his Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism criticized and rejected the existence of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction. His denial of this distinction has obviously touched on a fundamental doctrine 
which some philosophers especially the empiricists have accepted as a dogma that is 
taken for granted and therefore cannot be challenged.  
W.V.O. Quine 
The two dogmas, which Quine treats in his seminal work, include on the one hand 
the cleavage between truths which are analytic or grounded in meaning independently of 
matters of fact and truth which are synthetic or grounded in fact, and on the other 
reductionism, that is the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some 
logical construction upon terms which refers to immediate experience18. It will be 
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recalled that the root of the distinction lies in the Humean bifurcation of relations of ideas 
and matters of fact which he used to categorize all objects of human reason or 
knowledge. No doubt, Kant accepts this Humean fork and insists that analytic a priori 
propositions are true or false simply as a matter of the meanings or definition of the terms 
contained in them, while synthetic a posteriori are true or false by a recourse to matters 
of fact in the world. Again, Kant introduced a third kind of proposition or judgement 
synthetic a priori as we showed above, whose truth can neither be based wholly upon the 
mere logical analysis of the concepts they contain nor upon sense experience, but on a 
combination of both. The doctrine of reductionism seems to be well expressed by the 
positivist principle of verification which is used to demarcate between significant and 
insignificant statements. To be sure, the doctrine of reductionism simply is the view that 
statements have a meaning by being reducible to statements about sense-experience19. 
We have had to explain in brief the main points of analytic-synthetic distinction and the 
doctrine of reductionism in order to provide a background of Quine’s critique. 
Quine contends that there is no clear distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements and as such it is, unreasonable for anybody to say of synthetic statements as 
true because it matches up with experience or by appealing to any analytic statements to 
legitimize our assertions since they are not susceptible to empirical confirmation. 
However, Quine claims that our assertions cannot be legitimated by any appeal to 
sentence meanings that is analyticity. Rather such legitimacy or justification is possible 
because of the stimulus response to which all members of the community assent to most 
of the time. Hence any justification of our beliefs by the invocation of analyticity is, to 
say the least, circular. Such arguments that have been posited by those who attempted to 
reformulate analyticity in order to avoid the circularity, are, according to Quine highly 
dubious since such attempts normally use terms or notions like synonymy, that are in the 
same family with analyticity, to define it. Based on this, Quine submits that, “For all its a 
priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has 
not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical 
dogma of empiricism, a metaphysical article of faith”20. 
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The other aspect which attracted Quine’s critical search light is the belief that 
analytic propositions are immune to revision that is irrefutable. That is to say that all 
analytic statements must be confirmed no matter what the world is like. But Quine 
dismisses this, arguing that there are no propositions that are immune to revision and that 
any proposition would be revised in response to recalcitrant experience. Quine 
generalizes his revisability thesis even to the principles of science and laws of logic that 
were hitherto taken as well entrenched. It is Quine’s claim that we tend to think of the 
principles of science and laws of logic as irrefutable and irreplaceable simply because it 
is pragmatically reasonable for us to hold them at present, but once an alternative is 
found, we have no good reason to cling to them. 
If Quine’s position is allowed them, we must reject the so-called distinction 
between analytic or necessary truths and synthetic or contingent truths. Following from 
this blurring of the distinction between analytic-synthetic, necessary-contingent, fact-
value e.t.c Quine argues that our ontological schemes describe phenomena in different 
ways since they distribute predicates over a whole range of sentences which are held true 
by all members of the community most of the time. On this Quinean holistic account, 
which, as it is now familiar, derives from Duhem’s epistemological holism, sentences can 
be assigned determinate truth values as a function of their role within the community21. 
Now the acceptance of this fact compels us to reject such notions as ‘necessity’ or 
‘universality’ as vacuous. Again if this point is acceptable, there must be on principle a 
strict ‘ontological parity’ between different conceptual schemes (Western and African, 
for example), and one’s preference of any is purely a matter of personal choice and 
pragmatic considerations, rather than on any over-arching principles or criteria. I am 
aware of the objections22 raised against Quine’s critique of the empiricist dogmas by 
Grice and Strawson and Putnam, among others, but I will not got into the controversy 
here except to say that their objections are not fatal to Quine’s position. Whether or not 
any one believes it, the rejection of the analytic- synthetic distinction has serious 
consequences for analytic philosophy and the foundationalist epistemological enterprise 
because following from Quine’s revisability thesis it is no longer reasonable for us to 
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cling to the image of an empirically neutral epistemology providing a priori criticism or 
justification of science and the rest of culture.  
Wilfrid Sellars 
 Similarly Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on ‘the myth of the given’ forces us to rethink 
our belief in the epistemological foundationalism. The myth of the given is simply the 
view that there are certain kinds of self-authenticating, non-verbal episodes, which 
consist of direct encounters with objects, and the authority of such encounters is 
somehow transmitted to the verbal performances which express them”23. What this boils 
down to is that there are facts that are non-inferentially known and which each instance 
of knowledge of them presupposes no other knowledge and as such serves as ultimate 
court of appeal for other claims. But Sellars argues that it is unreasonable to claim that 
there is no kind of knowledge which presupposes no other knowledge since for him 
justification is a holistic phenomenon which implies that the legitimacy of any belief at 
all demands ipso facto the legitimacy of others. Thus the claim that there are facts that are 
‘given’ and which are based on some pre-linguistic entities like ‘I am in pain or this is 
red’ is, according to Sellars, mistaken, and arguing that knowledge begins with the ability 
to justify and since language is pubic and intersubjective, all given’ elements which 
purportedly ground knowledge are simply a part of our overall social practice.24   
Also it is worth remarking that the insights of the post-empiricist philosophers of 
science tend not only to undermine our belief in science as the only paradigmatic mode, 
but also that “there can be other forms of knowledge other than the natural science”. In 
this regard, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Mary Hesse, among others, are united in 
arguing for alternative discourses or conceptions25.  One consequence of this view is that 
the search for an Archimedean point or objective criteria with which to evaluate the 
rationality of a belief is, to say the least, misguided. They contend that a peoples’ beliefs 
and the status of such beliefs can only be judged rational within the totality of the 
society’s culture, since other forms of knowledge and belief have their truth-value 
embedded within the context of the society from which they spring.  
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Richard Rorty 
At this point, it is important to note that our discussion so far ties in one way or 
another with Rorty’s anti-foundationalist position which will pre-occupy us now. As we 
intimated earlier that Rorty seems to be fascinated by the anti-epistemological stance of 
Quine and Sellars because they have been able or shown how to subvert the image of 
philosophy as a foundational discipline which legitimizes or grounds the claims to 
knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion. As Rorty puts it, 
When Sellars’s and Quine’s doctrines are purified they appear as complementary 
expressions of a single claim; that no account of the nature of knowledge’ can rely 
on a theory of representation which stand in privileged relations to reality. The 
work of these two philosophers enables us... to make clear why an account of the 
nature of knowledge can be, at most a description of human behaviour26. 
Even though, Rorty agrees with Quine’s and Sellars’s arguments, he nevertheless 
expresses some reservations about the result of their inquiry. The point here is that 
whereas some critics accuse them of taking an extreme position in their attack of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction and the myth of the given respectively, Rorty accuses them 
of not being sufficiently radical since according to him., they should have drawn the 
unpalatable conclusion of the death of epistemology rather than saying that epistemology 
can be replaced by a legitimate scientific inquiry ; that is attempting to evolve a new 
epistemology, apparently referring to naturalized epistemology proposed by Quine, 
According to Rorty, both of them are still caught up in the empiricist dogma they 
attempted to subvert. Consequently, Rorty describes this attempt as a form of 
metaphysical realism, a reactionary development, a last-ditch attempt to hold onto the       
a temporal, Kantian scheme-content distinction in a desperate attempt to avoid Hegel and 
historicism27. In spite of these few critical remarks on the project of Quine and Sellars, 
Rorty acknowledges that it is still their project that culminated in the eventual collapse of 
the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian legacy of epistemology, and thereby opens an alternative 
way of perceiving knowledge28. 
Post-Modernism 
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Meanwhile, let us examine however briefly the connection of views of the 
philosophers treated above with that of the post-modernist thinkers like Derrida, Foucault 
and Lyotard, among others. It is necessary to do this because their views share in a 
remarkable way with post-modernism which is characterized mainly by a distrust of 
human reason’ and the metarrative privileged positions arrogated to philosophy and 
scientific knowledge. The term post-modernism, like modernism, is not susceptible to 
easy definition because it has become a catch-word for philosophers, sociologists, literary 
theorists, Marxists, artists, architects, media pundits, feminist theorists e.t.c. This problem 
is further complicated by what is now fashionable in contemporary thought to ascribe 
postness to such terms as post-structuralism, post-colonial, post-marxism, post-industrial 
even posthuman which as Niyi Osundare says has kicked up temporal, spatial, even 
epistemological problems29. In spite of this difficulty however, an attempt is made to 
delineate what it means in a broad sense. The prefix post, in ordinary sense, implies that 
which comes after a rupture with the earlier period-modern30. In other words, the term is 
taken to mean an epochal break not only with the modern era but also with various 
traditionally modern ways of viewing the world. Still, post-modernism, following the 
writings of Foucault and Norman Brown, implies not only the deconstruction of man and 
the end of the humanist credo, but also the epistemological break with genitality and the 
dissolution of focused sexuality into the polymorph perversity of oral and anal pleasure30. 
What emerges from this is that no matter how one defines post-modernism, it must 
include a rejection of the established order or orthodoxy. In philosophy and literature, 
according to Kwame Anthony Appiah, post-modernism is against foundationalism and a 
rejection of the high seriousness of modernist writers as well as the stable meanings 
found in modernist writings respectively32. 
It is important to remark that those who propagate this view may have been 
influenced by the Nietzchean suspicion of the tradition of Western philosophy which 
claims to be a grand totalizing and metanarrative theory providing answers to problems 
posed by other discourses. Post-modern discourse does not only reject this, but also seeks 
to subvert and transcend the logic of oppositions like logical or pre-logical, civilized or 
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savage, masculinity or femininity, etc., which the West had constructed in order to 
categorize phenomena differently and thereby place one in a sort of pedestal position 
over the other. The position of the post-modernist thinkers especially Derrida, is that the 
binary opposition is an arbitrary one since there is no objective, transcendentally valid 
reason to relate one to the other or even relegate one to a condition of dependence on the 
other33. 
Now if we tie together the views of Quine, Sellars, Rorty and the post- modernist 
thinkers, among others, we will notice that the attempt by some philosophers to ground 
philosophy on a foundational plank is illegitimate. If, as Quine has shown, that truths of 
language and factual truths are interdependent and inseparable, then there can’t be any 
talk of conceptual propositions which are separate from empirical ones. Again if this is 
accepted, then the analytic-synthetic, necessary-contingent grid breaks down, and with it 
the foundationalist search for a priori philosophy, that is, a philosophical system which 
stands apart from other cultures or knowledge systems. Following the collapse of the 
scheme- content grid other cultural or epistemological systems (including African 
epistemology once held captive by philosophy are fully liberated and allowed a 
conceptual space to air their ‘voices in the on-going conversation of mankind a voice 
which commands no special authority over the right of others to say what they want, and 
whose pronouncements rest upon no special insight into the nature of knowledge’34. 
The point of discussion so far is that there are no trans-cultural criteria of 
knowledge and rationality for all human discourses and cultures because rationality is an 
essentially contested concept. Put differently rationality and epistemic justification are 
explainable by reference to the collective beliefs and practices of a particular epistemic 
community since every culture or community has its own way of ordering reality, its own 
world-view.  
Conclusion 
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 We can conclude the easy by reiterating the basic thrust of our argument here by 
saying that it is difficult to sustain the argument that there are fixed immutable 
(Archimedean) point in philosophy as posited by some philosophers as noticeable in the 
writings of Descartes, Locke and Kant, among others, that there are trans-cultural criteria 
of rationality. But it has been shown that rationality is an essentially contested concept. If 
this is granted, then it is reasonable to argue that rationality is explainable by reference to 
the collective beliefs and practices of a particular epistemic community since every 
culture or community has its own way of ordering reality, its own world-view. The moral 
of this dispersed view of philosophy is to argue for tolerance and accommodation of other 
cultures, beliefs, religions and civilizations of the marginalized or subaltern peoples of 
Africa, Asia and Australia. 
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